Defining Translinguality by Horner, Bruce & Alvarez, Sara P.
University of Louisville 





University of Louisville, horner.bruce@gmail.com 
Sara P. Alvarez 
Queen's College, CUNY 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/faculty 
 Part of the English Language and Literature Commons, Reading and Language Commons, and the 
Rhetoric and Composition Commons 
Original Publication Information 




Horner, Bruce and Alvarez, Sara P., "Defining Translinguality" (2019). Faculty Scholarship. 451. 
https://ir.library.louisville.edu/faculty/451 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The 
University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu. 
LiCS 7.2 / November 2019
1
Defining Translinguality
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Sara P. Alvarez—Queen’s College, CUNY
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[Translinguality] is an occasion for labor, the labor of revision that is always what 
we, in concert with our students, take up, and take responsibility for (whether or not 
we acknowledge that responsibility) in our thinking, teaching/learning, writing.
  —Lu and Horner, “Translingual Work,” 216. 
In this essay, we address conflicting views of translinguality in the fields of composition and of language and literacy education more broadly. Our aim is not to identify the correct meaning for translinguality, nor do we expect to be able to resolve all dispute about the meaning of the term—a task that from our perspective is not merely futile but misguided in its approach to language and language users. Rather, we intend to use the mixed history and 
mixed usage of translinguality as well as some of the terms and practices with which it is 
often linked—e.g., plurilingualism, translanguaging, code-meshing, second language writing, 
bilingualism, multilingualism—to tease out differences in the positions that might be taken 
on language and languages, language users, contexts of use, and the relations of all these to 
one another, and to better understand how writing takes place within and beyond norms of 
monolingualism (see Lu and Horner, “Translingual Literacy”). 
We argue for translinguality as a way to interrogate and unveil terms of language 
ontology, language user agency, and the kinds of social relations advanced: matters of 
ideology about language and language practice. While this project is theoretical in its 
concern with conceptualizations of all these, we take theory to be “a process in society,” as 
Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff put it, the aim and point of which is “social intervention” 
(2, 3). Hence, our project is directed not at cataloguing the various positions to be taken on 
language, language users, contexts of use, and the relations of these to one another, or even 
in adjudicating among these, but, instead, at advancing a particular position on these and 
articulating what distinguishes that position from others. At the very least, it is hoped that 
the articulation of our position will help to account for some of the confusions and conflicts 
besetting recent discussions on translinguality.
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We begin by describing the current state of scholarly discourse on translinguality in composition 
studies, locating that discourse in the larger context of both changing sociocultural and sociopolitical 
conditions and the scholarship from a range of disciplinary perspectives addressing language 
difference in response to those changing conditions. We then distinguish among these responses in 
terms of the ontological status accorded languages and, consequently, the ways that difference in 
language is understood; the kind of agency ascribed to language users in relation to languages; 
“By recognizing the role of language users’ 
concrete labor in sustaining and revising 
language, a translingual orientation 
acknowledges opacity and friction as normal 
components of social interactions rather than 
as problems to be eradicated or condemned.”
and the implications of particular 
configurations of these for social 
relations and, more specifically, 
social justice. We use these 
distinctions to articulate our own 
perspective on translinguality, 
one that has grown to focus on 
the concrete labor of language 
use as a means of advancing social relations to language other than those treating language(s) and 
even language practices as commodities, and to make more salient how translinguality addresses 
social justice concerns. Commodity relations occlude the role of concrete labor in (re)producing 
language, rendering language not as itself the ongoing outcome of labor but, instead and at most, a 
set of available tools or resources for achieving so-called transparent or effective communication. In 
contrast, a translingual orientation, at least as we define it, can bring back into recognition the role of 
that concrete labor in sustaining and revising language, and hence can redefine the social relations 
between and among language users and language. By recognizing the role of language users’ concrete 
labor in sustaining and revising language, a translingual orientation acknowledges opacity and 
friction as normal components of social interactions rather than as problems to be eradicated or 
condemned. Based on that perspective, we offer a critique of alternative formulations of language 
difference generally and translinguality in particular and call on composition teacher-scholars to 
rethink language difference  in light of that critique.
Translinguality in Context: 
The (Re) Emergence of Language Difference
The term translinguality came to prominence in composition studies with the 2011 publication 
of “Language Difference in Writing: Toward a Translingual Approach” (Horner et al., 2011, hereafter 
“LDIW”). But the emergence of that term can best be understood as one point in a trajectory of growing 
interest in and concern about how composition teachers and scholars might better understand and 
respond to language difference in writing. LDIW itself references CCCC’s 1974 position statement 
Students’ Right to Their Own Language, and the original bibliography accompanying LDIW presents a 
long list of scholarly works that the authors describe as “helpful in [their] thinking about translingual 
work” (309), at least some (though not all) of which can be identified with composition scholarship. 
So, despite the LDIW authors’ admission that they are still “at the beginning stages of [their] learning 
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efforts in this project” (310)—a position marked by the denotation of their project in the title as 
merely working “Toward a Translingual Approach” (emphasis added) —LDIW can be seen not so 
much as initiating but, instead, articulating, forwarding, and attempting to give a particular direction 
to an ongoing move toward what the authors term “a translingual approach” to language difference. 
Different Terms, Same Meaning?
In that ongoing move, scholars who now explicitly advance a translingual perspective 
have previously invoked other available terms to name what they would argue for (see Trimbur, 
“Translingualism”). For example, prior to Suresh Canagarajah’s publication of his book Translingual 
Practice and his edited collection Literacy as Translingual Practice, Canagarajah has argued for a 
“codemeshing,” a “plurilingual,” and a “world Englishes” approach to writing (“World Englishes”; 
“Place”; “Translanguaging”); Juan Guerra and Keith Gilyard have (separately) called for a “transcultural 
literacy” approach (Guerra, “Cultivating”; Gilyard, “Cross-Talk”); Lu and Horner, two of LDIW’s co-
authors, have argued for a “multilingual” approach to resist monolingualism (“Resisting”); Horner, 
Donahue, and NeCamp have argued for taking a “translingual norm” to work “toward a multilingual 
composition scholarship” (emphasis added); and in 2002, LDIW co-authors Horner and Trimbur 
argued for “an actively multilingual language policy” to supplant the tacit policy of unidirectional 
English-only monolingualism they identified with US composition (“English Only” 597). Thus, over 
the course of a few decades, a variety of terms have been put forth by composition scholars to name 
the preferred alternative to monolingualism (see Canagarajah, “World Englishes” 273-74), inevitably 
causing some degree of confusion, and to a great extent adding to the conflation of other approaches 
more firmly associated with these other terms with a “translingual” approach. 
Different Meanings for the Same Terms: 
Translinguality, Plurilinguality, Code-meshing, Translanguaging
Confusion about the meaning of translinguality and alternative terms is furthered by different 
uses of each of these terms by both composition scholars and scholars in related fields. So, for 
example, Lachman Khubchandani writes of a plurilingual “ethos” that has long governed language 
practice in the Indian subcontinent (“Plurilingual,” Revisualizing), whereas the Council of Europe 
advocates inculcating plurilinguality as a new kind of communicative competence needed now: 
•	 To equip all Europeans for the challenges of intensified international mobility and 
closer co-operation not only in education, culture and science but also in trade and 
industry. 
•	 To promote mutual understanding and tolerance, respect for identities and cultural 
diversity through more effective international communication. 
•	 To maintain and further develop the richness and diversity of European cultural life 
through greater mutual knowledge of national and regional languages, including those 
less widely taught. 
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•	 To meet the needs of a multilingual and multicultural Europe by appreciably developing 
the ability of Europeans to communicate with each other across linguistic and cultural 
boundaries, which requires a sustained, lifelong effort to be encouraged, put on an 
organised footing and financed at all levels of education by the competent bodies. (3)
Both comparative literature scholar Steven Kellman and the MLA Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign 
Languages advocate what they call translinguality, but the former treats it as a kind of special 
“sensibility” characterizing writers of literature who compose in what is viewed as more than one 
language or in a language other than their perceived “primary” language (Kellman and Stavans 
13), whereas the latter addresses translinguality as a competence to be inculcated in students to 
prepare them for an increasingly globalized world. Hence what the MLA Ad Hoc Committee on 
Foreign Languages identifies as a translingual competence appears to mean something close to the 
“plurilinguality” advocated by the Council of Europe (cf. Molina).1 
Jeroen Gevers treats translinguality as necessarily involving, and coterminous with, code-
meshing, whereas LDIW co-author Min-Zhan Lu rejects the metaphor of “codes” (“Metaphors”), 
and she and Horner reject defining translinguality in terms of code-meshing, instead defining 
a translingual approach as “one that recognizes difference as the norm, to be found not only in 
utterances that dominant ideology has marked as different but also in utterances that dominant 
definitions of language, language relations, and language users would identify as ‘standard’” 
(“Translingual Writing” 586; see also 600; Vance). Paul Kei Matsuda has observed that, adding to 
the confusion, “[M]any applied linguists use the term ‘code-mixing’ interchangeably with code-
switching, which is more or less the same idea as code-meshing,” but that, alas, as he acknowledges, 
the heretofore idiosyncratic use of code-switching by Wheeler and Swords (a.k.a. “codeswitching”) 
to refer to maintaining separate spheres for designated codes rather than mixing and meshing 
them “is also beginning to make its way back to applied linguistics” (“It’s the Wild” 134). Adding 
further to the confusion, code-switching is regularly conflated with translanguaging (see Li Wei, 
“Translanguaging and Code-Switching”; Otheguy et al. 282; cf. Canagarajah, “Codemeshing”). To 
address this confusion, Juan Guerra has proposed the more felicitous term “code segregation” as an 
alternative to what code-switching has come to mean, albeit as of this writing his proposed term has 
yet to gain traction (Language 27). 
A further conflict appears in the terms claimed for moving beyond the purely linguistic in 
conceptualizing communicative practices. For example, while Li Wei defines translanguaging as 
an approach that treats “language as a multilingual, multisemiotic, multisensory, and multimodal 
resource for sense- and meaning-making” (“Translanguaging as a Practical” 22), Canagarajah states 
that it is codemeshing, “[u]nlike translanguaging,” that accommodates the possibility of mixing 
communicative modes and diverse symbol systems (other than language)” (“Codemeshing” 403, 
emphasis added).
The broader scholarly context adds further grist for confusion. For example, there remains 
a longstanding tradition in comparative and world literatures of treating the term translingual as 
signalling little more than writing that involves movement from one language to another (see for 
example Kellman; Liu).2  In David Gramling’s provocative analysis of The Invention of Monolingualism, 
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for instance, translinguality is invoked to infer simply writing that entails translation from one 
named language to another. And Ryuko Kubota, in her attempt to unveil what she sees as a troubling 
“multi-plural turn” in applied linguistics, unfortunately lumps translingualism with translanguaging, 
plurilingualism, code-meshing, and metrolingualism, ignoring the multiple and conflicting ways 
each of these terms has been defined (see Moore and Gajo; Li Wei, “Translanguaging as a Practical” 
9-10).3
Labor Pains
This history of the use of different terms for what may be the same perspective, and of ascribing 
different, even contradictory meanings and perspectives to the same term, gives a somewhat different 
inflection to Lu and Horner’s admonition that “translingual” is “at most, and at its best, an occasion 
for labor” (“Translingual Work” 216). We take the need for such labor not as a reason to dismiss 
the potential of the term: we do not imagine that the matter will someday be settled, nor do we 
believe that disputes about its meaning signal a limitation in the term itself. Instead, we take the 
differences in the meanings being attributed to translinguality as evidence of the growing struggle 
accompanying an emerging epistemological break, in composition studies and elsewhere, regarding 
languages, users, contexts of use, and the relations of all these to one another.4  
Because, in our view, translinguality signals that break, it is to be expected that, rather than 
grasping its significance in terms of such a break, translinguality is instead commandeered to 
signal the equivalent of other, more familiar, understandings of these—e.g., conventional models of 
multilingualism, or mixed language use (code switching and/or meshing), use of what are commonly 
viewed and treated as “nonstandard” forms of a particular language (e.g., world Englishes, AAL) or 
mixtures of these with what is expected will be recognized as “standard”—and that it is conflated with 
competing terms that have recently emerged to make sense of language difference—plurilingualism, 
translanguaging, metrolingualism, cosmopolitan literacy, transcultural literacy (cf. Otheguy et al., 282, 
for a similar discussion about uptakes of translanguaging).5   
This brings us to the larger context prompting the emergence of translinguality and these 
other terms: the increasingly undeniable linguistic heterogeneity and fluctuating character of 
language practices worldwide, brought on by changes in global communication technologies and 
migration patterns, with the locus classicus being Steven Vertovec’s (2007) notion of the emergence 
of “superdiversity.”6  It is in light of the perception of these changing conditions that what had once 
seemed like adequate conceptual frameworks for understanding language, languages, language 
users, contexts of use, and the relations of these to one another have come under challenge. For 
example, in 1997, Constant Leung and his colleagues, writing about the urban English context, 
argued that while “TESOL practice in the schooling sector in England has implicitly assumed that 
ESL students are linguistic and social outsiders and that there is a neat one-to-one correspondence 
between ethnicity and language . . . . demographic and social changes in the past 30 years have rendered 
such assumptions inadequate and misleading, particularly in multiethnic urban areas,” leading them 
to call on teachers to “question the pedagogical relevance of the notion of native speaker” (543, 
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emphasis added). In 2006, Suresh Canagarajah, pointing to “intensified globalization of English in 
postmodern society,” argued that “if earlier arguments haven’t radically changed the status of English 
varieties in literacy and education, recent social and communicative developments should” (“Place” 
588), with the implication that world Englishes can now take their rightful place in composition 
teaching, and that “Outer” and “Expanding” Circle users of English have a significant role to play 
in shaping the constitution of “English.” Horner, writing in 2010, argued that those working in the 
“Anglo-American sphere” in composition needed to engage in cross-language relations in part as a 
response to “changes in the language backgrounds of the students in our classes, or at least changes 
in our perceptions of our students’ languages” following from changes in patterns of immigration 
to the US, in admissions to US college and universities, the growing permeability between ESL and 
non-ESL students, as well as the globalization of English (“Introduction” 3, 4, 5). Xiaoye You, in 
his 2016 book advocating “cosmopolitan English” and “transliteracy,” describes the emergence of 
“new conceptualizations of language and literacy” in applied linguistics, literacy studies, and writing 
studies as a response to “[t]he proliferation of symbols and meanings due to colonization, migration, 
trade, and communication technologies” that he claims “is a defining feature of our times” (ix). And 
writing in 2018, Li Wei argues that what he terms the “Post-Multilingualism” era “raises fundamental 
questions about what language is for ordinary men and women in their everyday social interactions,” 
given the fact that, as he sees it, 
simply having many different languages is no longer sufficient either for the individual or for 
society as a whole, but multiple ownerships and more complex interweaving of languages 
and language varieties, and where boundaries between languages, between languages and 
other communicative means, and the relationship between language and the nation-state 
are being constantly reassessed, broken, or adjusted by speakers on the ground. Concepts 
such as native, foreign, indigenous, minority languages are also constantly being reassessed 
and challenged. What is more, communication in the 21st century requires much more 
involvement with what has traditionally been viewed as non-linguistic means and urges us 
to overcome the ‘lingua bias’ of communication. (“Translanguaging as a Practical Theory” 
14-15, emphasis added; cf. Creese, Blackledge, and Takhi 191)
As such works also make clear, the dominant, prevailing language ideology in contradistinction 
to which they are positing alternatives remains monolingualism.7 That ideology posits languages as 
stable, internally uniform, and discrete from one another. Each language is identified with a particular 
nationality and/or race/ethnicity as a defining attribute of that nationality and/or race/ethnicity (think 
“French” or “Chinese” as denoting not merely a nationality but also, at least ostensibly, its inhabitants’ 
sole, stable, internally uniform language/culture/ethnicity), and language users are expected to have 
a single such language as their birthright as its “native speakers.” Their ostensible command of that 
language (as monolith), achieved naturally through advance to adulthood, is posited as the target 
for others to aim for, however unlikely these others may be to reach that target. A shared language 
is deemed essential to communication, treated as the unproblematic transfer of meaning among 
its speakers—an assumption that renders diversity, let alone superdiversity, suspect. Opacity, by 
contrast, is deemed as evidence of a failure to use the language properly, or to grasp it fully. Language 
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difference is thus the exception to the norm, acceptable only as the expression of creative genius by 
those so authorized—e.g., Writers of Literature (see Lu, “Professing”). 
In challenging notions of the native speaker, the status of world Englishes, and (therefore) 
notions of target languages, language acquisition, and standard languages, composition scholars are 
aligned with and learning from past as well as current scholarship in related and intersecting fields of 
language study. For example, back in 1975, Einar Haugen suggested that the concept of a language, 
while in some ways a “useful fiction,” “can now be replaced by more sophisticated models” (335).8  In 
1985, Thomas Paikeday pronounced the native speaker “dead.” In a 2000 review of an edited collection 
on standard English, Nikolas Coupland concluded that “there are good reasons to move on from 
ontological perspectives that reify, describe and account for S[tandard]E[nglish] as a ‘natural’ or 
‘necessary’ sociolinguistic reality” (632), in alignment with arguments made earlier by Rosina Lippi-
Green and later by James Milroy. In 1997, Alan Firth and Johannes Wagner called for a break from 
what they termed the “individualistic and mechanistic” view of discourse and communication they 
saw as then dominating second language acquisition (SLA) studies, arguing that such a perspective 
“fails to account in a satisfactory way for interactional and sociolinguistic dimensions of language” 
(285). Rejecting the legitimacy of dominant SLA conceptions of a “target language,” “interlanguage,” 
and “learner,” and the distinction between “native” and “nonnative” speakers, they called for “a 
significantly enhanced awareness of the contextual and interactional dimensions of language use,” 
among other changes (286). Peter Mühlhäusler, in his 1996 book Linguistic Ecology, proposed an 
ecological model that abandoned the “givenness” of languages and the boundaries between them and 
the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic means of communication. As Jean-Louis Calvet 
observes, this effectively calls into question “the whole contemporary linguistic approach,” which is 
effectively “blown out of the water” (13). 
These (and other) studies suggest that the growing interest among scholars of composition and 
literacy studies in challenges to prevailing notions of language and language difference is, if anything, 
late, its own history of shifting understandings of these constituting the equivalent of tidal debris 
marking, and produced by, earlier shifts and forces emanating elsewhere. But it is more likely the case 
that, as in other related fields, acknowledgement of the inadequacy of such concepts is commonly 
followed quickly by ignoring the implications of what is acknowledged, as Otheguy, García, and Reid 
rightly complain (283, 286). Hence complaints that the insights of translingual theory regarding, 
say, the ontological status of language are not “new” to other fields are beside the point: however 
well established these insights may be in these other fields, those fields honor them primarily “in the 
breach,” allowing them to remain largely unaddressed, unconfronted, ignored. 
Conditions, Catalysts, and Conflicting Responses: 
Ideological Struggle
A degree of confusion in response to any epistemological break seems unavoidable. We take 
at least some of this confusion as a manifestation that scholars are mistaking the conditions of 
more apparent linguistic “superdiversity,” brought on by changes to global migration patterns and 
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communication technologies, as themselves representing a new norm to replace monolingualism, 
rather than as merely the precipitating catalyst for questioning prevailing orthodox views of 
languages, language users, contexts of use, and the relations of these to one another. So, because 
practices of code switching/meshing and translanguaging appear to challenge the discrete 
character of languages, they are themselves sometimes taken as preferable to refraining from 
such code-switching/meshing (see, for example, Young, “Keep”). However, as Gramling, Makoni 
and Pennycook, and others have observed, such a move can reinforce monolingualist ideology by 
pluralizing it, leading to a multilingualism that, while seeming to bespeak tolerance, maintains the 
boundaries between languages from among which writers are now permitted to draw more broadly 
(as “resources” or “repertoires”) and reinforcing insistence on transparency in communication (of 
goods, services, and most of all, capital—see Gramling 37 and passim; Blackledge et al. 192-93; 
Blommaert, “Complexity” 613; discussion below). In such uptakes, the monolingualist ideal of clear 
and untroubled communication remains, and code-switching/meshing and translanguaging become 
no more than a means of achieving that ideal, reinforcing the reification of language practices into 
readily identifiable and discrete “codes” available for mixing or meshing (see Lu, “Metaphors”; Vance). 
Alternatively, the tenets of a translingual perspective on languages, language users, contexts of 
use, and the relations of these to one another might well be posed even absent any ostensible changes 
in communicative practice toward more recognizably “mixed” or “meshed” forms.”9  That they have 
not been posed previously is not in itself evidence that communicative practice has changed in 
“[T]he development of a different perspective 
on language and language difference is a 
signal not of a change in language practices 
to be heralded as an improvement on or 
repudiation of previous practices. Instead, 
it is a change in how language(s), language 
users, contexts of use, and the relations of 
these to one another are understood: a change 
in how we think language difference.”
specific ways, any more than a 
change in scientific thinking 
signals a change in natural 
phenomena. Instead, the 
alternative may represent simply, 
if crucially, a change in our 
understanding of language 
practice (cf. Gasset 242). Hence, 
just as the “new literacy studies” 
developed not as a response to a 
change to literacy practices—a 
reaction to some new set of phenomena—but, instead, as a change in how literacy was to be 
understood (e.g., as an ideological social practice) (see Street, “New” 28), the development of a 
different perspective on language and language difference is a signal not of a change in language 
practices to be heralded as an improvement on or repudiation of previous practices. Instead, it is a 
change in how language(s), language users, contexts of use, and the relations of these to one another 
are understood: a change in how we think language difference. Thus, the translingual slogan that 
language difference is the norm is not an indication of changes to language practices from, say, 
homogeneity to heterogeneity in uses of “named languages.” Rather, difference in language is itself 
conceptualized differently, as an inevitable feature of all utterances, whether deemed “standard” or 
not, conventional or deviant. 
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The concept of ideology is useful in this regard. We can take language ideologies as representing 
a constellation of beliefs about languages and their relations to language users and contexts of use. 
But all language ideologies are by definition at some remove from actual language practices while 
nonetheless influencing those practices, most obviously but not solely at the level of policy (see 
Kramsch, “Privilege” 23). So, for example, there is a longstanding belief in the U.S. that English is and 
always has been the official and only language of those perceived as its citizens despite strong evidence 
to the contrary (see Crawford, Hold; Kloss; Trimbur, “Linguistic”), and there is a longstanding belief 
that specific demographic populations are characterized by their use of a single, stable language 
variety, again despite strong evidence to the contrary (see, for example, Riggs, Royster). That remove 
of ideology from actuality provides grist for challenging particular language ideologies for their 
failure to adequately represent the realities of language practice. Indeed, as we argue above, that 
failure is part of what has led to efforts to formulate alternative conceptions of languages and their 
relations to one another and to language users and contexts of use. 
However, it is also possible, far easier, and therefore far more tempting to accommodate those 
practices that contradict a prevailing language ideology to that ideology. In such a strategy of 
accommodation, those practices are either treated as mere exceptions to or deviations (creative or 
mistaken) from the rule, effectively reinforcing it, or they are adapted to the ideology. In the case of 
the language ideology of monolingualism, we can see the former strategy in the distinctions between 
performance and competence and notions of an interlanguage (Firth and Wagner), or the treatment 
of these practices as evidence of “creativity” in the “breaking beyond” standards by those deemed 
Artists. We can see the latter strategy in reifications of seemingly deviant practices as constituting 
additional sets of language standards, each appropriate to a designated social sphere (see Fairclough). 
But a more damaging, because unintended, response is to imagine one is pursuing a break 
with that ideology while its governing assumptions continue their reign in the proposed alternative 
model. The difficulty here is real: how to think a phenomenon differently than the available terms 
and conceptual frameworks seem to allow. We can see efforts to give novel inflections to conventional 
terms like “multilingualism” in the examples cited above as one strategy by which to meet that 
challenge. Another is to invent neologisms (or steal to give new meaning to terms from other fields): 
the invention or uptake of terms such as plurilingualism, translanguaging, and translinguality can be 
understood as attempting this strategy. However, as already suggested, even these efforts can lead 
to mistaking a difference in packaging for a difference in substance: old wine in new bottles. At 
least some of the excitement generated by the emergence of these neologisms can be attributed to 
just such a false sense of difference, given the ultimate comfort yielded by the domestication of the 
ostensibly unfamiliar thereby achieved. In those cases, the break attempted through the introduction 
of the neologism is effectively repaired by redefining the break in terms that accommodate it to the 
dominant ideology.
We have then conditions precipitating an epistemological break, various kinds of responses to 
those conditions, and significant confusion. In light of the confused status of terminology, we sort 
through this not by terminological categories—translinguality vs., say, translanguaging or code 
meshing or plurilingualism—but by considering what might constitute an epistemological break 
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from the language ideology of monolingualism. We argue for translinguality not in opposition to 
these other categories—futile given the diverse meanings currently ascribed to each and all—but, 
rather, in terms of language ontology, language user agency, and the kinds of social relations 
advanced: matters of ideology about language and language practice. A translingual approach, we 
argue, can and should be defined in a way that constitutes a break with dominant monolingualist 
language ideology in the ontological status it accords language(s); the agency attributed to language 
users; and the social relations to advances. We argue further that while translingual theory, as we 
define it, responds to many of the same phenomena as do arguments for translanguaging and 
plurilingualism, and aligns with many of their claims, it can be distinguished from these arguments 
by its insistent focus on labor as its point of address in defining language difference. Its foundation in 
a labor theory of language leads to a quite different, though not competing, set of social justice 
concerns in relation to language difference than those articulated by advocates of translanguaging 
and plurilingualism. It defines language difference in terms of labor that is not typically recognized 
as labor, and hence a definition not readily recognizable as having anything to do with either language 
difference or social justice. Against an insistence on achieving understanding, it argues for opacity as 
a constant, necessary element of social interaction—what Edouard Glissant refers to as the “right to 
opacity” (Poetics 190).10 With that insistence on opacity comes recognition of the inevitability as well 
as constant necessity of labor in engaging such opacity. Given its applicability to all language use and 
users, a translingual theory is thereby less likely to be relegated to the cultural margins. For it takes 
as its point of departure not particular language practices already marked by the language ideology 
of monolingualism as “different” but, instead, all language as labor confronting and producing 
difference. 
This focus on labor 
has prompted concern that 
translingual theory may 
risk “flattening” all language 
difference, thereby neglecting 
significant differences in the status 
accorded some kinds of language 
difference and those populations 
identified with them—even, 
ironically, differences in the labor 
demands imposed on those with 
lower status by those enjoying 
more privileged status: who is 
required to explain themselves 
to whom, how, according to and judged by whom. Such concerns emanate from and focus on the 
language differences that monolingualism has already disposed us to recognize as such: the sense in 
which we each and all speak and write a variety of language by definition at some distance from, and 
therefore different than, the putative “standard.” Importantly, as Gilyard, Otheguy et al., and others 
“With that insistence on opacity comes 
recognition of the inevitability as well as 
constant necessity of labor in engaging 
such opacity. Given its applicability to all 
language use and users, a translingual theory 
is thereby less likely to be relegated to the 
cultural margins. For it takes as its point of 
departure not particular language practices 
already marked by the language ideology of 
monolingualism as “different” but, instead, all 
language as labor confronting and producing 
difference.”
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have rightly pointed out, such differences do not enjoy the same status nor, hence, have the same 
kinds of consequences for specific groups of speakers (Gilyard, “Rhetoric” 286; Otheguy et al.). Those 
kinds of language difference are consequent upon monolingualist reifications and commodifications 
of language that produce a sense of specific varieties of language (including idiolects and dialects 
as well as the “standard” language): languages and language varieties understood as entities that, as 
Gilyard puts it, people “have” (or don’t, “Rhetoric” 287) but that are accorded different levels of status 
(including negative status) on the basis of the status of those individuals and groups to which they are 
said to “belong.”11 The resulting differences in labor are differences in commodity relations—here, 
differences in the exchange value ascribed various reifications of languages/language varieties. Such 
reifications of languages and varieties are ascribed particular exchange values depending on their 
putative communicative power, an ascription that occludes the labor entailed in making meaning 
from any and all utterances.
We can see these reifications operating in the argument Otheguy et al. make for translanguag-
ing. Otheguy et al. distinguish between idiolects and what they call “named languages” by deeming 
the latter but not the former social constructs rather than properly linguistic categories, however use-
ful in other ways. These “named languages” are defined as “not true linguistic entities because their 
boundaries are established on non-linguistic grounds. Rather, they are groupings of idiolects of peo-
ple with shared social, political or ethnic identities” (Otheguy et al. 291). The authors acknowledge 
that “there are, to be sure, large areas of overlap between the idiolects of people who communicate 
with each other,” including people from the same region or nation sharing “some sort of linguistically 
mediated cultural or historical identity” (290). But the authors maintain a sharp divide between such 
groupings and idiolects per se.
The sharp divide that Otheguy et al. attempt to maintain between idiolects and “named lan-
guages” is meant to highlight, first, the circular illogic of presuming a linguistic category—e.g., “En-
glish”—prior to analyzing features of language practice categorized thus to define that category. More 
forcefully, it is intended to honor the unity among the language resources that bilinguals/multi-
linguals are said to possess, rather than seeing them as a mixture that might be identified from an 
“outside” perspective as belonging to and combining separate categories (e.g., Spanish vs. English). 
As Otheguy et al. state, “seen from the point of view of the speaker, that is, from the insider’s per-
spective, . . . the question of which words [in a bilingual’s vocabulary] belong to English and which 
ones belong to Spanish (and which ones to both) cannot be asked coherently. . . . they all belong to 
the same idiolect” (291). The insistence on this unity is the basis for their argument that bilinguals 
should be allowed to draw on as full a range of their idiolectal resources as monolinguals are, through 
“translanguaging,” rather than being restricted to using only some of their resources on the basis of 
artificial social boundaries on language use (e.g., using only words designated as English)  (295). 
Translanguaging, they argue, refers to the act of deploying all of a speaker’s lexical and structural 
resources freely. . . . without regard for socially and politically defined language labels or boundaries” 
(297, emphasis in original), a freedom they wish all to have access to.
But in invoking idiolects, Otheguy et al. reintroduce the reification of language that they are 
otherwise at pains to undermine in their treatment of named languages and the accompanying 
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demand for transparency in communication, as opposed to recognizing the normality of opacity 
in communication.12 The notion of language as stable “resource,” described as what individuals 
possess (“all the words together [‘Spanish’ and ‘English’] [that] belong to Ofelia and Ricardo and 
their children, that is, to their idiolects” [291]), while being rejected in terms of nation states, is 
accepted in terms of the individual as a means of achieving such communicative transparency. We 
can see this in their argument regarding anxieties over the preservation of minoritized languages. 
They reject the aim of “preserv[ing] a pure, well-bounded and essential collection of lexical and 
structural features,” but then argue for the “affirmation and preservation” of “a cultural-linguistic 
complex of multiple idiolects and translanguaging practices that the community finds valuable.” 
As they state, “It is toward the affirmation and preservation of these complexes, and not of named 
essentialist objects, that [language] maintenance and revitalization efforts are properly directed” 
(299). Thus, while rejecting the reification of named languages (e.g., Euskara, Maori, Hawaiian, 
English, Spanish, French, etc.), their argument deflects that reification onto complexes of idiolects 
and the “community” of the speakers of those idiolects, a deflection that simply redirects questions 
about what constitutes the essence of the “named” language into questions about whose idiolects will 
count as the “community’s” (and who is authorized to say).
In contrast, the labor perspective on language difference for which we argue breaks from such 
reifications and commodifications of language (and language difference), and thereby from the 
commodity relations underlying the rightly decried linguicism. Rather than asking what words or 
other linguistic features to allow or not, or to categorize in a particular way, to achieve transparency 
in communication, it focuses on the labor involved in (re)producing specific languages; it asks what 
difference any particular utterance—by definition phenomenologically different from others in 
spatiotemporal location and, therefore, in sociopolitical significance—might make, and by means 
of what kinds of labor. Rather than posing that question in terms of rhetorical effect by restricting 
the differences possible to those made to the situation addressed—as conventional rhetorical 
considerations would—it asks what difference an utterance might make to the language deployed: 
whether and how it might reinforce and thereby contribute to the sedimentation of, challenge, or 
pose new meanings to specific lexico-grammatical and other cultural practices, and how the labor of 
utterance inevitably transforms those practices (including the transformation represented by their 
further sedimentation), and what processes and conditions might contribute to any one of these 
consequences. Hence, as Horner observes, rather than calling for a break from ordinary practice, 
a translingual orientation calls “for a different understanding of what language practice entails,” 
its critical political edge arising “less from the language rights such an orientation demands and 
more from its recognition of the agency of language ‘users’ operating in all language use” (Horner, 
“Reflecting” 108).
By insisting on the inevitability of the spatiotemporal, and hence sociopolitical, difference of all 
utterances for the contexts of use and the language used, it restores to recognition the contribution 
made by the concrete labor of speakers, writers, listeners, and readers to the reproduction of 
“conventional” language practices, sought after by many student and other writers, and hence 
their status vis-à-vis those practices. For rather than restricting recognition of “production” and 
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“creativity” only to those utterances that are lexicogrammatically deviant from what is deemed 
merely commonplace and conventional, it recognizes the inherent productivity operating in 
language “reproduction,” the creativity operating in the “recreative.” From a translingual perspective, 
language, as Blommaert puts it
is fundamentally creative, and it always produces something entirely new within the 
bandwidth of the sociolinguistic or socio-semiotic economies in which participants dwell. 
Note that, thus, creativity can not be seen anymore the way we saw it until now: as special. 
It is simply the default mode of production of what we call, by lack as yet of better words, 
‘language’—hence ‘languaging’. (“Complexity” 614, emphasis added)13
Ontology
The questionable ontological status of language is, for us, most succinctly put by Calvet’s formu-
lation “Practices > Languages,” signaling that languages are the ever-emerging outcome of practices 
rather than entities that practices merely express.14 As he explains, “[I]t is practices that constitute 
languages. . .  [L]anguages exist only in and through their speakers, and they are reinvented, re-
newed and transformed in every interaction, each time that we speak” (6, 7). This means that, at 
least in terms of the conventional, monolingualist conception of languages, “languages do not exist; 
the notion of a language is an abstraction that rests on the regularity of a certain number of facts, of 
features, in the products of speakers and in their practices” (241). 
This is close to Otheguy et al.’s deconstruction of “named” languages (286ff.). But, Calvet 
continues, “Coexisting with these practices there are representations—what people think about 
languages and the way they are spoken—representations that act on practices and are one of the 
factors of change. They produce in particular security/insecurity and this leads speakers to types 
of behaviour that transform practices” (241, emphases in original). Hence, as Calvet explains, “the 
invention of a language and consequently the way it is named constitute an intervention in and 
modify the ecolinguistic niche” (248, emphases in original). 
This is how it is possible that, while languages do not exist in the same way that, say, the universe 
exists, beliefs about language exist and affect practice, and, hence, affect language, idiolects included. 
In short, the divide Otheguy et al. wish to maintain between idiolects and named languages is, by 
Calvet’s account, regularly breached. And, while it is true, as Gilyard complains, that “when I am 
around a group of people who speak a language foreign to me, it amounts to nothing to counsel myself 
that language is really an abstraction and that those speakers don’t really have that language that I 
don’t comprehend” (287), his complaint, pertinent to Otheguy et al.’s argument, does not contradict 
Calvet’s notion of language as an abstraction that Gilyard is critiquing. Instead, it speaks to the power 
of representations (as language practices themselves) to affect subsequent practice, including, for us 
most powerfully, the representation/belief that the opacity in communication Gilyard complains of 
is abnormal rather than the inevitable, constant norm and component of all communicative acts.15  
We can see that representation/belief in the Council of Europe’s argument for plurilinguality. 
At least as the Council defines it, plurilinguality seems to be aimed at eliminating, or at least 
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ameliorating, the hypothetical situation Gilyard describes of not understanding the language. For 
the plurilingualized individual would have some partial understanding of at least some of what 
was being said, depending on the individual’s specific competence in that language, and, hence, it 
would be less foreign to that person. Opacity would thus be reduced, if not eliminated. By effectively 
rendering languages as mere codes available for various decoding and recoding, such an approach, 
in line with monolingualism, has as its aim the erasure of difference through occluding the labor of 
translation (cf. Flores; Gramling). 
Those responses to the language ideology of monolingualism that herald mixing of languages, 
or codes, or that herald the legitimacy of what are deemed non-standard languages/codes would, 
conversely, seem to reinforce the ontological status of the languages or codes posited. As Otheguy et 
al. themselves warn, “[N]o matter how broadly and positively conceived, the notion of code switching 
still constitutes a theoretical endorsement of the idea that what the bilingual manipulates, however 
masterfully, are two separate linguistic systems” (282; cf. Blommaert, “Complexity” 613). So, for 
example, while Vershawn Ashanti Young maintains that all language “codes” are always already 
“meshed,” hence not separable as “codes,” he also argues strongly that such meshing be allowed to 
take place. Code-meshing, then, appears at once to be unavoidable, on the one hand, and yet, on the 
other hand, also a choice, or what should be permitted, in contradistinction to, say, code segregation. 
At least some arguments for translanguaging appear to suffer from a similar confusion. For 
example, Li Wei argues that translanguaging refers to a process of language production rather than to any 
specific forms that result, and hence would appear to constitute at best an orientation to communicative 
practice that is intended to “challenge boundaries . . . between named languages, boundaries between 
the so-called linguistic, paralinguistic, and non-linguistic means of communication, and boundaries 
between language and other human cognitive capacities” (“Translanguaging and Code-Switching”). 
But the practices identified as exemplifying such challenges—communications that “cross” what 
viewers/listeners/readers are predisposed to recognize as distinct—appear to be dependent on, and a 
reaction to, the boundaries they “challenge,” and thereby, perversely if inadvertently, risk reinforcing 
those boundaries. However valuable such challenges may be as tactics, they do not challenge the 
distinctions themselves, only arguments for the segregation of what is accepted by the language 
ideology of monolingualism as ontologically distinct: here, one language vs. another, what is and 
isn’t linguistic, etc. It is telling, in this regard, that, as we argue below, such arguments have as their 
primary focus language users and uses already marked by the language ideology of monolingualism 
as different—bilinguals mixing or translanguaging.16 
Agency
Agency in language use is commonly located in acts that break, intentionally, with perceived 
norms, in close relation to notions of creativity defined in terms of novelty or “artful” performance: 
utterances that are “distinctive from ongoing interaction, in which the communication itself is 
highlighted and subject to evaluation by an audience,” even the “routine use of creative forms” (Swann 
and Maybin 491, emphasis added)—what is deemed (art)work, not labor. Insofar as perceived norms 
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are identified with the hegemonic, breaks from perceived norms are seen as manifesting criticality, 
whereas reproduction of such norms is identified with lack of criticality. This excludes from 
consideration the (possibility of the) exercise of agency in the (re)production of forms not deemed 
creative, not distinguishable from “ongoing interaction.” And even that agency that is recognized, 
as Lu and Horner have argued, is typically recognized only in “mainstream” students: those who 
are deemed to already be in command of the routine, hence whose breaks from routine forms are 
ascribed an intentionality not ascribed to comparable breaks by students deemed nonmainstream: 
those labeled basic writers, L2 writers, nontraditional students (Lu and Horner, “Translingual 
Writing” 583; see also Alvarez). Conversely, Lu and Horner observe, “mainstream writers’ seeming 
iterations of standardized forms and meanings are perceived as evidence of . . . their conformity to 
‘common sense’ or orthodoxy, while the seeming iterations of standardized forms and meanings by 
‘nonmainstream’ writers are perceived as evidence of either their mastery of the privileged language 
or their betrayal of their home or first languages” (583)—a perverse exercise of agency, if that.  
Arguments for code-switching/meshing and translanguaging seem likewise concerned with 
those utterances that in some way deviate from what are recognized as language norms, specifically 
utterances that deploy a mix of languages, particularly in ways that deviate even from conventional 
practices of code-switching (as linguists have traditionally defined that term). First, as Otheguy et al. 
acknowledge, the notion of code switching is understood as “the expressive transgression by bilingual 
speakers of their own separate languages, endow[ing] these speakers with agency and often find[ing] 
in the very act of switching elements of linguistic mastery and virtuosity” (282, emphasis added). 
Likewise, Li Wei argues for translanguaging as evidence of creativity and criticality, stating that
Translanguaging underscores multilinguals’ creativity—their abilities to push and break 
boundaries between named language and between language varieties, and to flout norms 
of behaviour including linguistic behaviour, and criticality—the ability to use evidence 
to question, problematize, and articulate views. . . . From a Translanguaging lens, 
multilingualism by the very nature of the phenomenon is a rich source of creativity and 
criticality, as it entails tension, conflict, competition, difference, and change in a number of 
spheres, ranging from ideologies, policies, and practices to historical and current contents. 
(15)
Li Wei makes it clear in his article that he is primarily concerned with the language practices of 
“multilingual language users,” and he offers translanguaging as a “practical theory of language [that] 
offers better interpretations” of those practices (11). Especially for those of us used to dominant 
invocations and assumptions of a generic but decidedly white male heterosexual middle-class US 
English monolingual as the (unstated) norm (see Matsuda, “Myth”; Ohmann 145, 148-49), this 
concern is both necessary and long overdue. But necessary as it is, this goal by definition excludes 
those language practices that observers are disposed to deem unmixed, uncreative, uncritical—
that is to say, the overwhelming majority of language practices. These, then, are relegated to the 
uninteresting and uncreative. It is against these that translanguaging is posed as the alternative.17  
What stands in the way of recognizing the agency of more typical, conventional, and (therefore?) 
uninteresting and (or because) presumably uncreative, uncritical utterances is an atemporal 
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conception of language, a conception that maintains its residence even in those arguments, 
like Li Wei’s, attempting to redefine language in terms, and as an outcome, of practices. It is that 
atemporal conception of language that renders particular features visible as distinctive, creative, 
different, new by positing a stable, internally uniform, discrete, atemporal norm against which those 
features are set. Such a conception of language, while recognizing the element of criticality in the 
recognizably unconventional, fails to recognize the element of criticality operating in production 
of the conventional, thereby denying the agency operating in efforts to reproduce the conventional 
(Horner, “Reflecting” 108-09). The inextricability of reflection from action through the word that 
Freire insists upon (128) is thus rendered extricable, exceptional rather than normal, rare and the 
province of the few rather than a constant (however repressed), for all.
Paradoxically, that conception renders the norm of monolingualism and the monolingual 
speaker (see above) effectively unassailable, invulnerable: hegemony rather than merely hegemonic, 
its status not—unlike the “hegemonic”—in continual need of repair and sustenance (see Williams, 
Marxism 112-13). In the case of Li Wei’s argument for translanguaging, the non-multilinguals (or at 
least those deemed thus) and their practices of reiterating linguistic forms that appear to be readily 
identifiable with a particular named language in “regular” ways are dismissed from consideration 
altogether, thereby allowing the status of such practices as “regular” and as internally uniform, stable, 
and discrete from other languages to go unchallenged—e.g., what is deemed to be “SE” as, indeed, 
constituting standard English. Conversely, by recognizing the temporally different character of all 
utterances, including reiterations of the seemingly conventional, we can challenge the very stability 
and internal uniformity of the conventional. For, as Blommaert reminds us regarding language 
identity work, “[i]t is the habituated, low-key, routine, and ritual of identity work that shows us—
amazingly—how complicated and dynamic the demands are on such work in any instance, even if 
the work is performed just ‘in the pursuit of sameness’” (“Complexity” 620).
To take up such work, the questions Li Wei asks about the examples of translanguaging 
utterances—“the sociopolitical context in which these expressions occur, the history of [the language 
variety named], the subjectivities of the people who created and use these expressions, as well as the 
ideologies, including linguistic ideologies, that these expressions challenge”—would then return as 
relevant to all expressions, as would questions about the ideologies reinforced by the expressions 
under consideration.18 But to do so would be to acknowledge the labor necessary to maintaining as 
well as revising and challenging all ideologies and languages, hegemonic and counterhegemonic.
Social Relations
It is manifestly the case that the “movement” toward an epistemological break in how languages, 
their users, and their contexts of use are to be understood has been driven not only, and even not 
primarily, by changes in language practices that previously dominant conceptions of language are 
inadequate to explain. Rather, it has been driven at least as much, if not more, by the urgent need 
to defend and stand with communities who have historically and presently been the target of racial, 
ethnic, and class prejudice and discrimination: in the US, most prominently, African Americans, 
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Native Americans, Latinx/e people, residents of Appalachia and the rural South, the poor, and people 
perceived to be recent immigrants from the “global South.”  Insofar as language, tied by the ideology 
of monolingualism to race, class, ethnicity, region, and nationality, has been used as a proxy target 
for discrimination against people identified with these communities, many teachers and scholars of 
language, including written language, have directed their efforts at defending the legitimacy of the 
language practices of those targeted: e.g., African American Language, Native American languages, 
translanguaging, code-mixing and meshing. Against the demand to “Speak English, This is America!” 
they have insisted on the right and value of knowing, speaking, and writing a variety of languages in 
a variety of ways. 
In these arguments, language difference is defined in two ways: 1) the use of what are already 
demarcated as distinct languages—e.g., Spanish, Navajo, French, Chinese, Arabic—in settings where 
these are not the dominant demarcated language—e.g., in the U.S.—and 2) the use of any language or 
languages, dominant or not, in unconventional ways—e.g., mixing of languages, or using a language 
variety—e.g. AAL—deemed inferior to or of less value than the “standard” (because of its association 
with groups with lower social status). We focus on the latter insofar as these appear to challenge the 
stability and internal uniformity, and discrete character of demarcated languages, such as English. 
So, for example, Li Wei defends the “New Chinglish” by observing that 
the myth of a pure form of a language is so deep-rooted that there are many people who, 
while accepting the existence of different languages, cannot accept the ‘contamination’ of 
their language by others. This is one of the reasons for Chinglish to have been the object of 
ridicule for generations, even though the creative process it represents is an important and 
integral part of language evolution. (“Translanguaging as” 14)
Against such ridiculing, Li Wei argues for the critical and creative character of Chinglish. 
Ofelia García and Camela Leiva go further, arguing that translanguaging serves social justice. 
First, they argue that “for US Latinos, translanguaging offers the alternative of performing a 
dynamic bilingualism that releases them from the constraints of both an ‘Anglophone’ ideology that 
demands English monolingualism for US citizens and a ‘Hispanophone’ ideology that blames US 
Latinos for speaking ‘Spanglish’ . . . or for their ‘incomplete acquisition’ of their ‘heritage language’” 
(“Theorizing” 200). But they distinguish translanguaging from other “fluid” language practices—e.g., 
what has been called polylingualism, transidiomatic practices, metrolingualism, code-meshing—by 
its “transformative” character. For García and Leiva, translanguaging “could be a mechanism for 
social justice, especially when teaching students from language minoritized communities” through 
its efforts “to wipe out the hierarchy of languaging practices that deem some more valuable than 
others” (200). The gist is to level the status of languaging practices by recognizing the value in 
those previously held in low esteem. As Otheguy et al. likewise claim, “Translanguaging evens the 
playing field, giving bilingual students the same opportunity that monolinguals have always had, 
the opportunity to learn and grow while enjoying the intellectual and emotional benefits of all one’s 
linguistic resources” (305). 
In these arguments, translanguaging is treated as both a technique for achieving and evidence of 
the achievement of social transformation. So, for example, García19 states that, for her, 
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Translanguaging refers to social practices and actions that enact a political process of 
social and subjectivity transformations, which in turn produces translanguaging. Besides 
challenging the view of languages as autonomous and pure, translanguaging as a product 
of border thinking, of subaltern knowledge conceived from a bilingual in-between position, 
changes the locus of enunciation and resists the asymmetries of power that “bilingual 
codes” often create. (García and Leiva 204, emphasis added)  
While there is a lot to take in from this passage, we take the authors to be posing translanguaging as 
the deployment of a specific kind of formal expression that is simultaneously the means and purpose 
of social transformation. That postulation hinges on the idea of “enactment” as performative: 
translanguaging as both the expression of accomplishment and means of accomplishing a particular 
condition. We can see this same invocation in García’s discussion of the use of the music video “Si 
Se Puede” in her co-author Camila Leiva’s teaching of a high school class intended for immigrant 
newcomers to the US. Referencing the video’s “translanguaging where English is performed alongside 
Spanish, both in sound and image [to relate] one important message: Unidos todos con esta canción / 
Si se puede [United with this song, / Yes, we can],” García argues that 
It is the translanguaging that creates a unity that is difficult to express, neither immigrant nor 
native and yet both; neither Spanish or English, and yet both in autopoietic organization. 
The music video is neither in English nor in Spanish, but in “both” that is “neither” because 
it is a new discourse, a product of coloniality, a transculturación languaging. Because the 
students and Camilla are constituted in the translanguaging of the video, they are involved 
in a continuous becoming that is of neither one kind nor another, but that constitutes the 
liberating action of an autopoietic “Si se puede.” As they follow the translanguaging the 
students are confronted with alternative representations that release knowledge and voices 
that have been silenced by the discourse about illegal aliens in English that dominates the 
beginning of the video. (208, emphasis added)
It would be wrong to argue with the sentiments of this proclaimed unity, or with the inclusive and 
transformative effects of Leiva’s use of both Spanish and English in the classroom discussion of 
the video, as when Leiva “wants to create through translanguaging a discourse that goes beyond 
autonomous languages that represent sole national or transnational identities” (211). Translanguaging, 
García argues, “opens up possibilities of participation, while generating the fluid subjectivities that 
US Latinos need to succeed in US society. Translanguaging gives back the voice that had been taken 
away by ideologies of monoglot standards . . . , whether of English or Spanish” (211). 
In this passage, we see García making a moral argument about language rights: here, not the right 
to speak a given “named” language (Spanish or English) but, instead, the right to translanguage, i.e. 
produce utterances not readily identifiable with any single such language. This is a crucial argument 
we would support. From a labor perspective, however, there remain limitations to this view of 
translanguaging. Agency is attributed not to the speakers (or listeners) but, rather, to the technique 
of translanguaging—the deployment of a specific kind of forms, in this case the co-presence of both 
Spanish and English (in the music video and in the class discussion).20 And the transmission of that 
technique itself then becomes the aim, rather than constituting no more than a means of making 
LiCS 7.2 / November 2019
19
student participation in education possible. Of course, under the current educational and political 
regime, to grant the right to translanguage is a legitimate means of making student participation 
in education possible, and hence is necessary. But that is not the same, we argue, as assigning a 
liberating effect to the technique of translanguaging per se. 
This is all the more crucial insofar as language teachers, including writing teachers, may 
well find the attribution of agency to a language technique especially tempting to make, as it 
suggests that teachers can empower students by gifting them with, or “allowing” them to use, such 
techniques. Through translanguaging, teachers may believe they can “give voice” or “give back the 
voice” to students or “enable their voices to emerge.”21 But while it seems clear that insisting on 
“English only” in the classroom described would be wrong in all sorts of ways, it also seems clear 
that the translanguaging that is described cannot by itself accomplish what is claimed for it; that 
accomplishment, rather, belongs to the students in their work with the teacher. 
For, despite the claims for the accomplishment of social transformation through translanguaging 
(a transformation that makes possible translanguaging), the identification of the means of that 
transformation with the production of a specific set of formal linguistic features effectively abstracts 
the production practices identified as “translanguaging” from their spatiotemporal location, 
rendering those practices as able, in themselves, to produce specific effects. Translanguaging is thus 
commodified, occluding the labor of speaking and listening, reading and writing. The video, and 
moving across and between Spanishes and Englishes, by themselves are ascribed the power to 
produce transformation—an instance of commodity fetishism. In this way, the technique of 
translanguaging may appear to “level the playing field,” but the field, and the rules of the game being 
played, remain unchallenged. Everyone may 
now participate in that game of vocalization, 
but the commodity relations obtaining between 
the participants and the languages they vocalize 
remain unchallenged. Labor and the 
dependence of language on that labor become 
invisible.
Missing from this account are the range 
of possible meanings in response to the video, 
and to the mixing of Spanish and English, 
that may be produced through the specific 
concrete labor of instances of the speaking, 
listening, reading, and writing practices 
of specific speakers, listeners, readers, and 
writers. (Imagine, for example, the different responses to the video by English or Spanish or, for 
that matter, Chinese monolinguals, or those Spanish/English bilinguals committed to the language 
ideology of monolingualism). And missing from this account is the possibility of mixing of Spanish 
and English in efforts to produce, not a Latinx pan-ethnicity of the kind García sees Leiva and her 
students constructing (211), but quite different ethnic formations and politics (cf. Blackledge et al.). 
“In assessing the effects of 
languaging, we need to distinguish 
between (abstractions of) 
language practices per se and the 
material social conditions of those 
practices. But to recuperate all 
these possibilities would require 
attention to the labor of writing 
and, more specifically, rewriting 
and revision of the meanings made, 
through the labor of writers and 
readers, listeners and speakers.”
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In assessing the effects of languaging, we need to distinguish between (abstractions of) language 
practices per se and the material social conditions of those practices.22 But to recuperate all these 
possibilities would require attention to the labor of writing and, more specifically, rewriting and 
revision of the meanings made, through the labor of writers and readers, listeners and speakers. The 
meaning would not, then, be said to inhere in the video or translanguaging per se, but in the work to 
which the video and languaging practices are put. 
We can see García attempting to relocate translanguaging as social practice in some such 
conditions, as when she asserts, “It is not enough to claim that languaging consists of social practices 
and actions; it is important to question and change these when they reproduce inequalities. By 
appealing to the concept of translanguaging, I go beyond simple languaging as a social practice to 
emphasize that a new discourse is being produced by a new trans-subject” (203). But this then takes 
us from translanguaging altogether: one might well challenge language practices that “reproduce 
inequalities” while remaining well within the confines of what listeners or readers are disposed to 
recognize as only English (or Spanish, etc.). The emphasis on the novelty of the discourse and subject 
here signals not so much a material accomplishment but, rather, an imagined removal (or escape, or 
break) from material social history.
We belabor this point to highlight what we see as a distinguishing feature of translingual theory: 
in contrast to those approaches emphasizing specific linguistic features, such as translanguaging and 
code-meshing—translingual theory emphasizes the social relations of the language users to language, 
with language itself the ongoing product of, and dependent on, their concrete and embodied labor. 
Raymond Williams has observed that “the most important thing a worker ever produces is himself 
[sic], himself in the fact of that kind of labour” (Problems 35). If we accept that languaging is work 
(albeit of a kind we are disposed not to recognize as work, or as “productive”), then language users 
perennially produce a sense of themselves in the fact of that work. Monolingualist ideology represents 
language users as mere “users” of something given to them, with the responsibility of then having 
to use it “correctly” or “properly” or “appropriately.” Language work, in this representation, thus 
becomes a matter of following orders, and language workers are those who follow such orders (or 
defy them). Those who engage in translanguaging (or code-meshing) might well still see themselves 
in this way, but enjoying the newly given “freedom” of choosing from an expanded range of options 
and combinations: not just English, or Spanish, or both, but a mixture, as they please, as well as the 
diversity of “resources” within “named languages” and other forms of expression. This freedom of 
choice, however, that the enlightened teacher may give students maintains their position as no more 
than consumers—savvier and more fortunate consumers, no doubt, but consumers nonetheless (of 
music videos, languages, identities, brands, modes). The agency exercised, in other words, is the 
agency of selection from predetermined options given or assigned to them. 
By contrast, the translingual perspective we advance insists on shifting the sense of language 
use from consumption to production—even when the acts of production appear merely to 
exactly “reproduce” conventional forms. There is far less emphasis, or concern, with doing what 
is recognizably “new” (a hallmark demand of neoliberalism). Indeed, newness per se is from this 
perspective an irrelevant criterion—hence translingualism’s insistence on the inevitable newness, 
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phenomenologically, of every utterance, whatever forms are (re)iterated. Instead, there is an 
insistence on the role played by the concrete labor of every instance of writing and speaking, reading 
and listening in sustaining and revising any and all language, whether seemingly conventional or not, 
the social relations advanced through such usages, and the responsibility for contributing to such 
relations through ways of writing and speaking, reading and listening. The fact that much of that 
labor is likely to be directed toward maintaining those social relations currently obtaining does not 
make it any less productive, nor does it obviate the value of recognizing the role of language work 
in sustaining and, potentially, changing such relations, which are themselves basic productive forces 
(Williams, Problems 35). Language sedimentation is itself a never ending process. Utterances directed 
at maintaining existing social relations nonetheless change those social relations by rendering them 
reinforced and now obtaining in a different moment in time. The social relations “maintained” are 
thus different insofar as, through the labor of utterances, they have become further reinforced, like a 
path worn further by the steps of those following it.
The notion that language is work is not a new concept (see, for example, Rossi-Landi) but, rather, 
“basic Marxist theory” (Hickerson 695). Nonetheless, it is not a concept that has informed much of 
the recent attempts to rethink languages and their relation to users and contexts of use. Instead, 
thanks to the language ideology of monolingualism, language is imagined as a kind of property one 
either inherits or attempts to acquire, that one possesses (or not) and to which one does or does not 
have rights, including rights of use. In light of the venom directed at the languages of minoritized 
populations (as a means of directing venom at the populations themselves), language educators have 
reacted by defending those languages and language practices, whether in terms of language rights 
(e.g., the right to speak Spanish or Chinese or Navajo in the U.S.) or the value of novel uses made of 
these, e.g., translanguaging and code-meshing. As a consequence, those forms that we are predisposed 
by monolingualism to recognize as instances of creativity or resistance to monolingualist policy 
(because seemingly “new” or at odds with monolingualist policy) have garnered the most attention. 
This has led scholars like Matsuda to complain of a linguistic tourism that focuses on seemingly 
(from a monolingualist standpoint) exotic forms of writing (“Lure” 482-83). More damagingly, it has 
contributed to the commodification of language, denying the role played by language users’ concrete 
labor in maintaining and revising language. It has thereby contributed to the marginalization of 
the implications of the epistemological break we face regarding language, which now appears to be 
a phenomenon restricted to the language and language practices of minoritized populations, and 
therefore something that most of us—and particularly the dominant—can safely ignore. 
Alternatively, by pulling out from beneath them the ontological rug on which monolingualist 
conceptions of language have stood, a translingual approach to language difference can force a change 
in social relations by its acknowledgement of labor. We can justify language and writing classes not 
as a means of either giving students the (premade) tools they need, or giving them voice (or their 
“freedom”—as gift by definition spurious), or producing a social utopia confined to the classroom. 
Instead, we can see such classes as occasions for taking up more deliberately that work on language 
that students are already inevitably and necessarily engaged in. 
Claire Kramsch has observed of learners of a second/foreign language that 
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few of them are aware of the role they play as non-native speakers/actors in the life or 
death of a language, its development, its usage, its semiotic potential. . . . Learning a foreign 
language, with all the decentration, conflict, and discoveries this brings, is one of the more 
favorable academic means by which to restore to learners the discursive agency that they 
think they lack. (“Contrepoint” 322, our translation).23  
Thanks to monolingualism, almost all writers and speakers, “native” as well as not, believe they 
lack that same “discursive agency” that they in fact have (“la puissance d’agir discursive dont ils 
pensent manquer”). A translingual approach, then, would not attempt to gift them with such agency. 
Instead, it would use the classroom setting (official and unofficial) as an occasion for that agency to 
be acknowledged and exercised more consciously and deliberately, in the interest of rethinking, and 
potentially revising, social relations through such work—the work of language representation, as 
itself a language practice affecting subsequent language practice. Much of that work might well result 
in language forms that appear monolingual and conventional—there is, after all, a use to common 
practice, so long as it is recognized as no more than that, and hence always a work in progress. But it 
would be translingual in design. Students might well “learn English,” say, or written English, not as 
a given for their utterances to be measured against, but, in line with Kramsch, as a project to which 
both their learning and their utterances contribute. 
This changes the social relations in the classroom, admittedly in ways more laborious and less 
appealing than offering students liberation. There are no predetermined or final results to expect 
the course to lead to, nor any gifts to distribute or exchange. And the discursive agency students 
exercise also comes with greater responsibility than following orders (i.e., responsibility for the 
social relations language practices contribute to maintaining or revising), surely less immediately 
appealing than mere license under the guise of freedom, or than being told what they need to do 
to get through another day. But this is simply a way to acknowledge what is already happening, and 
cannot stop from happening, in the work of writing and speaking, reading and listening, despite 
teachers’ and students’ worst/best efforts. In bringing into visibility what monolingualist ideology 
denies, translingual ideology forces a reconsideration of the kind of languaging all of us do, might, 
and should participate in, and why, with no recourse to “standards” to tell us what we have to do 
(Alvarez et al.) .
Defining translinguality in terms of an epistemological break with monolingualist notions of 
the ontology of language, the agency of users, and the social relations of language practice whereby 
languages preexists users, users are mere consumers of languages, and commodity consumer social 
relations prevail is not how translinguality is commonly understood, since it breaks with what 
monolingualist ideology has led us to understand breaks with monolingualist ideology to be: being 
“free” to use “different” languages and having the freedom to use them “differently” (as if it were possible 
to do otherwise). Understandably, then, translinguality is all too often conflated with little more than 
more tolerant versions of monolingualism that allow for, even celebrate, what monolingualism itself 
leads us to recognize as different, exotic, new. And, particularly under current circumstances, there is 
an urgency to arguments for tolerance of people and their languages and language practices that have 
been identified not only as different but “other,” “dangerous,” even “criminal.” It is difficult to do more 
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than react to growing, and increasingly officially sanctioned, expressions and actions of in-tolerance, 
racial and ethnic prejudice, discrimination, hatred, misogyny, and violence. 
But it would be a mistake to be only reactive. Proactively, we need to reject the legitimacy of the 
very terms of the arguments made in defense of such intolerance. In the case of language prejudice 
and discrimination, we need to redefine all language as the continuing outcome of our collective 
ongoing labor, dependent on that labor for its continued viability. There is no “there” in language 
to defend, only a work in perpetual progress. To invocations to “speak English,” we can ask “What 
English, made how, and why, toward what ends, when?” (Alvarez; Horner, “Teaching”; Horner and 
Tetreault; Lu and Horner, “Translingual Literacy”). And these are questions that, quite rightly, we can 
pursue with our students as well. It is work that is necessary, that we’re all already doing, that requires 
everyone’s participation, and that therefore we can and should take up more deliberately.
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1 Further complications arise from differences between francophone and anglophone research 
traditions on plurilinguality (see Moore and Gajo).
2 This is not to dismiss such work, which especially in Liu brings out the problematics of 
translation that such movement precipitates and entails.
3 For a close analysis and critique of Kubota’s argument, see Blommaert’s “Superdiversity.”
4 For comparable arguments, see, for example, the special issue of Applied Linguistics devoted 
to the emergence of “trans” perspectives in language theories and practices (Hawkins and Mori), 
Blommaert and Rampton’s account of recent paradigm shifts (“Language and Superdiversity” 3ff.), 
and Canagarajah’s argument that translinguality constitutes a “paradigm shift” from monolingualist 
orientations (Translingual Practice 6).
5 For other accounts of the growing number of terms emerging to make sense of language 
difference, see Canagarajah, “Translanguaging”; Li Wei, “Translanguaging as a Practical,” Gevers; 
Lu, “Metaphors.”
6 A term that has been highly contested (see Flores and Lewis).
7 For a fuller analysis of facets of monolingualism as language ideology and its politics, see Yildiz; 
Watson and Shapiro.
8 And far earlier (1957), Jose Y Ortega Gasset proclaimed, 
what [linguistics] calls “language” really has no existence, it is a utopian and artificial image 
constructed by linguistics itself. In effect, language is never a “fact” for the simple reason 
that it is never an “accomplished fact” but is always making and unmaking itself, or, to put 
it in other terms, it is a permanent creation and a ceaseless destruction. Hence precisely 
the splendid intellectual achievement represented by linguistics as it is constituted today 
obliges it (noblesse oblige) to attain a second and more precise and forceful approximation 
in its knowledge of the reality, “language.” And this it can do only if it studies language 
not as an accomplished fact, as a thing made and finished, but as in the process of being 
made. (242)
9 Of course, the degree to which current communicative practices are somehow more mixed 
(linguistically and/or otherwise) than previously is questionable. On this, see, for example, 
Blommaert, “Complexity” 618; Trimbur and Press, “When”; Canagarajah, “Translanguaging” 3-4; 
and Yildiz.
10 Glissant explains, “I thus am able to conceive of the opacity of the other for me, without 
reproach for my opacity for him. To feel in solidarity with him or to build with him or to like what 
he does, it is not necessary for me to grasp him” (Poetics 193).
11 This is in addition to the common ascription of language differences to specific social groups 
in light of their social status regardless of any actual linguistic features of their utterances.
12 The same may be said of increasingly common invocations of language users’ “repertoires,” 
understood as resources they “have” that users can choose to deploy in various ways that do not alter 
the constitution of those resources—invocations rehearsing the kind of cloisonné model of language 
critiqued by Bernabé et al., but here ascribed to individuals.
13 Blommaert is not invoking the term translingual here (a term he treats as suspect), but we see 
his representation of language as in accord with the labor perspective on language we are advancing.
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14 Calvet 6. See also Pennycook, Language as a Local Practice.
15 On the necessity of recognizing the norm of opacity to communicative acts, see Bernabé et al. 
113, and Glissant, “For Opacity.”
16 Though Otheguy et al. see all speakers, including those deemed monolingual as well as those 
deemed bilingual, engaging in translanguaging, their concern is with the latter insofar as, in terms of 
their framework, the latter are prevented from engaging as freely in translanguaging as monolinguals 
are (297).
17 Blackledge et al. and Otheguy et al. do acknowledge the “mixing” of registers, etc. “within” a 
single named language as also constituting translanguaging, or “flexible bilingualism” (Blackledge 
et al. 192-93; Otheguy et al. 297). There is also, of course, dismissal of language practices as 
subnormal by the dominant, e.g., by those groups deemed subnormal, such as the language practices 
of African Americans and of those identified as white but residents of the US Appalachians.
18 Cf. Blackledge et al.’s argument that “the questions we need to ask are not limited to which 
languages are in use in an interaction and why. We also need to attend to the ways in which linguistic 
resources are deployed in our societies and how this deployment of linguistic resources reproduces, 
negotiates, and contests social difference and social inequality” (193).
19 While both García and Leiva are identified as the co-authors of the article, the article presents 
the speaker as “I,” and that speaker describes Leiva’s teaching using the third person (“Camila,” 
“she,” “her”; hence we alternate between representing the article’s authorship as plural and 
representing the presentation of the article’s argument as García’s. We apologize for any confusion.
20 Hence Canagarajah’s caution against the romanticizing of tranlanguaging (“Translanguaging” 
4-5).
21 For an early but useful critique of the limitations of this posture in critical and feminist 
pedagogy, see Gore, “What We Can Do for You!”
22 See Canagarajah’s caution about scholarship treating multilingual communication as 
“more diverse, dynamic, and democratic than ‘monolingual’ competence,” and his call to “adopt 
a critical attitude towards the reources/limitations and prospects/challenges of translanguaging” 
(“Translanguaging” 3).
23 “Peu d’apprenants ont conscience du rôle qu’ils jouent en tant que locateurs/acteurs non-
natifs sur la vie ou la mort d’une langue, son développement, son usage, son potentiel sémiotique. 
. . . L’apprentissage d’une langue étrangère, avec tout ce qu’elle apporte de décentration, de conflit 
et de découvertes, est une des matières scolaires les plus propices a . . . redonner aux apprenants la 
puissance d’agir discursive dont ils pensent manquer.” Thanks to Christiane Donahue for assistance 
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